1 North-East Says NO (NESNO), the campaign group against a regional assembly, itself offers a list which includes, amongst others: the decision to add conterminous local government reform to the debate; the Yes Campaign's failure to adopt a consistent message and a gimmick; and the overall brilliance and tactical élan of NESNO in targeting a simple anti-tax and anti-politician message to voters.
Introduction
An increasing number of European countries defy the traditional dichotomy of unitary state vs. federation. Over the last three decades, Britain, Spain, Italy and France have been at the forefront of a wave of regionalisation -the creation of subnational legislatures with extensive political powers which still fall short of the constitutional entrenchment which characterises federations. There may be good reasons for studying contemporary Britain in this perspective, with the devolution settlement soon to be put to the test by the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. This article, however, instead takes one step back and looks at the attempts to institute devolved legislatures from the late 1990s. The primary focus is on the contrast between Wales and the dog that didn't bark; English regionalism, as represented by the failed referendum on a directly elected Assembly in the North-East in 2004.
Numerous reasons have been posited as to why the North-East said 'No' in this referendum. Scholars argue that the limited powers granted to the proposed Assembly and the reluctance of Labour campaigners to argue for a regional assembly to chart a separate course from London whilst a Labour government was in power were key reasons. 1 North-East Says NO (NESNO), the campaign group against a regional assembly, itself offers a list which includes, amongst others: the decision to add conterminous local government reform to the debate; the Yes Campaign's failure to adopt a consistent message and a gimmick; and the overall brilliance and tactical élan of NESNO in targeting a simple anti-tax and anti-politician message to voters. 2 The purpose of this article is to focus on another important variable which has thus far been insufficiently analysed: the role played by the (formal and non-formal) structures of the dominant political party in the region. Hitherto, the literature on regionalism and parties has tended to focus upon how regionalisation has affected parties; our analysis focuses upon the inverse, highlighting the role of a dominant party in affecting the public resonance for (its own) territorial reforms. More broadly, this suggests that the creation of a regionalised state from a previously unitary political parties), the analysis of intra-party dynamics is equally essential. This raises a particular issue: the conceptual tension between national and regional party politics.
The research frontier on territorial politics has expanded over the last decade to provide much more nuanced observations on how parties respond in structural and ideational terms to regionalisation or federalisation. 4 Such changes in the formal allocation of power between territorial levels are found to be reflected in similar changes within the parties themselves, though in a less linear manner than what functionalist or rationalist theory would suggest. This is where the concept of the MLP becomes significant. 5 The institution of formal systems of multi-level governance pushes even the most unitary of parties to develop to match them. However, the way in which parties adapt varies with, among others, party competition at the regional level (spurred, in particular, by autonomist parties), the cleavage structure at the regional level, as well as party-specific features such as government-opposition role and inherited organisational and ideational structures. 6 For example, to remain with the (left/right, nationalist/unionist, etc.) across these formal institutional lines. 7 Also pertinent are the different audiences the party is appealing to at the Welsh and British levels -the electoral appeal being more classically social democratic in the former, compared to the centrist 'Middle England' swing-seats the party must win at the latter.
With such complexities differing from national case to national case -and within nations, from sub-national case to sub-national case -analysing sub-state political processes thus entails the risk of concept stretching, a familiar problem for comparativists. 8 Yet, accounting for political processes below the level of the state requires an analytical footing that is applicable across different settings. The concept of the MLP is amenable to such analyses, however, providing an analytical tool through which to grasp the relationships of communication, coordination and conflict across and between the different territorial layers of political parties.
One obvious challenge in theorising the role of parties in relation to territorial reform is their multifaceted role in the process. Parties are initiators and designers of territorial reform. They are also arenas within which debate unfolds and where arguments are brought to bear. 9 Moreover, they are organisations that adapt and respond to external developments which they cannot fully control. And finally, they are constituent units of civil society on each of the territorial levels they operate, thus filling the space for politics that is opened up by the creation of legislative assemblies below or beyond the dominant national level.
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To further our knowledge of regionalisation and multi-level parties, all of these roles merit further investigation. As noted above, in the extant literature, an avenue that is arguably under-theorised is the significance of parties -and particularly the dominant party -in shaping public perception of (and thereby the viability of) territorial reform. Here, the dynamic between national and regional within each party may be of as great significance as the dynamic between parties. Its consequences are found not in evident political reforms, but rather in the way such reforms are enabled and furthered (or blocked) by the parties themselves. The structures of relevance are formal and nonformal, thereby necessitating closer scrutiny not only of how the parties are organisationally disposed but also the way in which ideas and discourses open or close opportunities for deepening territorial autonomy at the regional level. 11 The Wales and North-East are both cases where one party -namely Labour -is overwhelmingly the protagonist. In the case of Wales, it can be convincingly argued that the Labour Party was the chief driving force in bringing about the devolution of power to an Assembly. England; the entity accounting for 83% of Britain's total population was kept nonexistent as a constitutional entity. 16 The question of remedying this was far from clear. Assembly. 21 Generally regarded as a logical response to the representative asymmetry introduced by 'Celtic' devolution, this was arguably a reactive rather than proactively sought policy. There are also questions of how well thought out it was: The revival of the previously rejected -and one-time 'Churchill-ian' -approach was specifically justified as democratization of the pre-existing regional structures, the Government Offices of the Regions; however, the apparent source of the formal, institutional boundaries of these 'regions' were 1938 civil defence plans for repelling a Nazi invasion. 22 Nevertheless, the plan was to start the regionalist ball rolling across Lloyd
George's 'progressive North', but when plans for referenda in Yorkshire and Humber and the North West were dropped, the process was set to begin in the North-East alone, statistically the most Labour-inclined region of Britain. -and moreover, 76% of the electors had voted for parties which supported a "Yes" vote in the referendum; when it came to the referendum, less than five weeks later, only 17% voted "Yes" -the population then reverting to form one year later with 83% of
Hartlepool electors voting for "Yes" supporting parties in the general election.
This clear failure of the Labour Party to persuade its voters in the North-East to say "Yes" to devolution was in contrast to the situation in Wales -another 'region' in which Labour is and has been the dominant party, where in 1997 Labour managed to convince a majority of its core support -albeit a marginal one -to accept devolution.
Turning to this case first, therefore, why did the Welsh say "Yes"?
Analysis: The Case of Wales
The linkage between the example of the campaigns for devolution in Wales and that of the North-East of England has been made before, most notably by Rebecca Davies. Like the Scots we are a nation. We have our own country. We have our own language, our own history, tradition, ethics, values and pride… We now in Wales demand the right to decide through our own democratic institutions the procedures and the structures and the priorities or our own civic life. 36 Similarly, where in 1979 the leadership -despite holding Welsh seats -had arguably failed to engage with the campaign, in 1997 Tony Blair threw his considerable weight behind the campaign while Head Office pumped money into the Principality -seeing this, not Scotland, as the 'marginal' battleground. It is also important to note that, whilst in 1979 the accusation had been that devolution had been a top-down policy dropped on the Welsh party, the subsequent years had seen a far more in-Wales campaign develop within the party in support of the policy to the extent that, by the time Labour was re-elected, there was a far-greater sense that this was a policy which came from within the party in Wales, not from the central leadership.
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That said, this is not to say that there was a greater enthusiasm amongst the party's grass roots: a perusal of the leader of the Yes Campaign -and future AMLeighton Andrew's book Wales Says Yes (1999) shows this not to be the case. It is also true to note that devolution was always an elite project, this only going further to emphasise the point: if Labour's support for the concept of Welsh devolution was crucial to its enactment, then so it also was to the contemporary instigation of the debate itself. The desire for constitutional reform (alongside those which constrained its ultimate form flowed not from the bubbling-up of a civic desire for Welsh devolution but from the Welsh Labour Party itself, as Labour was unaware before launching the referendum campaign of the existing level of demand for a Welsh Assembly. 38 With regard to the change from 1979 to 1997, therefore, the key differences were that: Labour was more united in support of the policy; here was a greater sense that the policy had developed within the party in Wales, rather than a sense of top- The argument drawn from a reading of the two referendums discussed above is that attempts at territorial reform benefit greatly from the dominant party within that region (especially where that party is the instituting party) having the structures in place, both formal and non-formal, to be engaged with and support the subsequent campaign. With this in mind there are two questions which need to be addressed: Significantly, alongside these sub-regional identities/antagonisms were further intraparty divisions which further undermined the search for a common, focused identity.
According to the member based out of Head Office: "North-East politics has always seemed to be slightly different from the other English region politics … Newcastle is a small group of actors, pretty influential, couple of tribes, not always getting on … there's the politics of some very, very strong politicians up there." What this means, they claim, is that when the issue of a shared identity within the party in the region came up, intraparty partisan identities took preference over a shared regional identity. Of these, a small number -Alan Beith, Joyce Quinn, David Clelland and Jim Cousinsstrongly supported the principle of regional assemblies. 55 However, few of those who expressed support for the policy of regional devolution 'were active and regular campaigners for the cause however' and as Rallings and Thrasher note, there 'had been little bottom-up demand for an assembly in the North-East' from party members, or the public at wide. 56 Rather, the decision that the North-East should be offered an assembly, it is widely agreed, was a top down choice which came specifically from the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, John Prescott MP. Part of a wider policy of English regionalism (which, as noted, was arguably adopted primarily in reaction to 'Celtic' devolution and pre-existence of 'democratisable' sub-state structures) the North-East was selected as the testing ground for a referendum not on the basis of local party enthusiasm, or even political advancement -unlike in Wales and Scotland, there was no regionalist threat to Labour. Rather, it was the belief that -not least because of party tribalism amongst the electorate -a Yes vote was most likely to be attained there.
This decision making process was symptomatic, in many ways, of the power relations within Labour at this time, especially with regard to the centralization of control.
Discussing the policy of elected regional assemblies in general, the then member of Labour Head Office in London describes how:
"this all came from a culture of the General Secretary and senior members of the party not being able to say "no" to the leader … someone rang [Head Office] from Number 10, "this must happen" and you know, it did, and it happened with very limited push-back. And to a lesser extent this was certainly the case with Prescott as well, where he said "I want these regional Prescott, it was his baby, which I'm not sure helped the situation either, in terms of promoting it." He does accept that there was some regional interest, but only is so far as it consisted, in his words, of Prescott "and his smoke filled rooms amongst regional figures". 58 The North-East Labour MP -since retired -who was previously quoted also provides a similar description. The policy, they claim, came from:
"John Prescott and a number of people within the region who, some of them obviously have Labour Party, Liberal party connections, but that in a sense didn't really feed through to the grassroots Labour Party member, let alone the grassroots Labour party supporter. I think it was a campaign that … there was a certain type of people that were involved in it but that wasn't entirely replicated throughout the stratas of membership and Labour voters on the doorstep." 59 Nick Brown offers a more conciliatory view; when asked if claims of the referendum being a top-down decision taken by Prescott are fair, Brown answers: "he didn't think that at the time and in fairness to him he had some reason in thinking there was support for it. Because there were people who believed a regional assembly model was the correct democratically based response, the proportionate response, to devolution." Part of the problem, according to Brown, is that such support amongst North-East MPs was shallower than Prescott realized and often granted for reasons of party collegiality rather than true belief. In Brown's words: "I was a moderate supporter of it at the time, I think, just because you want to pool your own views with those of your colleagues … but I didn't take an active part in the campaign … My heart wasn't in it." Obviously Head Office will have their own agenda and their own things they want that the Leader's office may not fully comprehend or get involve with, like a fundraising or a field operation strategy for example, or the sort of administrative stuff that the Leader's office wouldn't know or care about -but they will pull the leavers of all the regional offices"
But, as they continue, when it comes to such vertical intra-institutional power relations, some RPLs are more equal than others. As the Head Office worker puts it:
"Some regional offices are stronger than others and some regional directors are stronger than Nevertheless, what is clear is that, regardless of a lack of opposition, there was a wide-spread lack of engagement within the party in the North-East. According to one former North-East Labour MP (B), in office at the time of the referendum, "there was a scepticism about it" and "whilst there wasn't that expressed publically, I think it's fair to say, you would talk to senior figures within the local authority movement and they would have concerns". 64 Kevan Jones provides a similarly unenthused picture with regards to his northern colleagues in Westminster:
"Some people who were for it [campaigned], yes, in other cases [there was] a lot of lukewarmness because I think a lot of people by then, including myself, were saying we're not enamoured by the actual structures to be put in place. And I think, to be honest, amongst some MPs, they'd say where is that going to interface with their role down here "I think amongst certain people who were looking to get, obviously, positions in that new Assembly, yeah there was a lot of that, but I don't think that … it was actually."
Whilst avoiding the same charge of 'zealots' and jobs-for-the-boys as Jones, Nick
Brown describes his experience as the same:
"most of the Labour party didn't think it was the right answer. I know of no constituency which ran a grassroots campaign. … I did a couple of radio interviews on all this and that was about the extent of it. I didn't mobilise my own constituency team. I have quite a good operation in the constituency, but we carried on, we didn't put ourselves out -and there was certainly no sense of loss afterwards."
The former North-East Labour MP (B) paints a similar picture. Despite emphasising that he could "only largely speak for my GC and the rest of it", his sense is that: "a lot of people in the party didn't feel any sort of connection to the campaign, you know, council figures and the rest just got on with the job, I don't think there was any great sort of wide spread sense of failure or tragedy though out the party" 66 "in the run up to the North-East referendum there were resources sent from all over the country, so every region of the Labour party sent stuff, and we did packs of stuff for CLPs, there was phoning from the National Communication Centre, there was a script, we sent stuff out to the local parties to do campaigning and street stalls and things. There was a road show that John Prescott did with his wheel of fortune… There was a direct mail -five thousand direct mails for each CLP..."
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The perception that Labour's campaign as half-hearted could also be seen as grounded in a misunderstanding of what a referendum campaign at a regional level entails. The issue, seen from the centre, was that "it's very difficult to appreciate till you're doing it how completely different a referendum is to an election". Comparing the referendum experience to fighting an election seat by seat, the scale of the first "is so vast that our whole way of thinking about campaigning is about voter ID and then playing at the 2% margins, to get 2% more than the other people in your marginal seat. It doesn't translate to a referendum at all." 75 More significant, according to, all interviewees within the Labour 'machine', was the ill-fated timing of the referendum.
Commenting on the view by the NESNO that they, as the underdogs, had slain the Labour electoral 'leviathan', for example, the member of Prescott's campaign team disagrees:
"I think anyone who'd been involved would know that it wasn't the 'Labour leviathan'. The
Labour leviathan was not focused on the North-East referendum… So when I say the leviathan was not focused on the North-East referendum, it was because they were fighting the 
Conclusion
As the previous analysis had sought to demonstrate, political parties provide a crucialand hitherto under-theorised -mechanism for consolidating multi-level polities.
Analysis of the Welsh and North-East cases reveal the formative role played by the leading party; in opening a sub-state space for politics, but also in framing regional identities and sustaining popular mobilisation on territorial grounds. Furthermore, a party operating across multiple territorial levels relies upon not only formal organisational structures but also on a set of non-formal aspects, such as consolidated regional identities and horizontal identification to the regional party. 77 In order to add flesh to the bone of these structures, conscious efforts are required on each of the territorial levels. Effective political groundwork must translate identities and ideas rooted in the region into bread-and-butter issues of consequence to the region itself.
In the case of the North-East such factors were missing. There were no formal regional party structures within which debate could take place and support for such a policy grow; existing formal structures were relatively unengaged from party members and had a weak degree of autonomy and influence within the MLP. Furthermore, party members in the North-East were unable to articulate a clear sense of a regional or a regional party identity; both sub-regional (e.g. Newcastle vs. Sunderland) and metaregional (i.e. 'the north' in opposition to 'the North-East') identities appear to have taken precedence. Beyond identity, members in the North-East felt that the genesis of the policy was not from within the region -and certainly not from within the regional party -but rather a top-down decision thrust upon them from the central party level, for which there was no need. There was a collective lack of enthusiasm and a lack of campaigning amongst Labour MPs, councillors and grassroots in the North-East; and while the central party leadership in the UK Government provided vocal and paper resources, it was not actively engaged itself, as its campaigning focus was elsewhere.
In each of these the contrast between the North-East and Wales is instructive. While With this in mind, when determining the apposite conditions for an MLP campaigning for the devolution of power to a regional level, four key factors can be proposed as important variables positively effecting the likelihood of a successful outcome: First, the existence of formal institutional party structures, correlative with the regional level to which devolution is proposed, to provide regional leadership and a forum for debating regional affairs; Second, the existence of a non-formal collective party identity linked to these structures, both vertically within the Party (e.g.
identification with 'the Labour Party' as a British-wide institution) and horizontally (e.g.
identification with 'North-East Labour' as a regional institution); Third, a dominant perception that the policy of regionalism is generated from the regional party level and not simply passed down from the central office; and fourth, that the central party provide engaged support for the policy in any campaign. All four of these factors, it is argued, are vital if a party wants to campaign successfully for regional devolution of power.
The narrative of the 'Northern No' as opposed to the 'Welsh Yes' to devolution is typically seen as one of popular sociology and lack of public sentiment, as reflected in the age-old perception of English regionalism as 'the dog that didn't bark'. Yet it is also an account of an incompletely developed multi-levelled party that failed to install requisite organisational structures and develop a credible regional narrative. The response to what regionalism is for cannot be administrative convenience alone and must appear more than a 'tacked-on' policy response to constitutional change elsewhere. If parties are the backbone of democracy, their organisational and ideational structure -and its development vis-à-vis territorial demands -is key to understanding the consolidation of regionalised states.
